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Abstract: This study contributes to a growing volume of scholarship that highlights the 
importance of financial diversification in business history. It shows that, pre-WWI, 
financial advice for equal portfolio weighting, the so-called naïve diversification, then 
called scientific investment or geographical distribution of risk, was a sophisticated 
strategy for Victorian investors and not suboptimal to Markowitz optimization. 
Drawing upon a unique dataset of 507 individual portfolios at death, this study shows 
that, although Victorian investors, in particular wealthy investors, did diversify 
investment risk across a number of securities, they did not hold equally weighted 
portfolios. It explores possible reasons for the unbalanced nature of investor portfolios 
and dismisses socio economic factors, illiquidity, passive ‘buy the market’ and market 
timing strategies as possible explanatory factors. The results rather point to a strategy 
of naïve diversification spread over time, a ‘buy as you go and hold strategy’, buying 
new securities as savings allowed and holding them until death. 
 
Keywords: Diversification, Victorian investors, portfolio theory, risk management, 
Markowitz. 
JEL Classifications: N23, N83, G11. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study is focused on portfolio diversification by UK individual investors for the 
period from 1870 to WWI, a period when investors were faced with significant 
investment choice, both domestically and across the globe. Leslie Hannah’s most 
recent work has been a significant influence. Hannah has underlined in a number of 
ways how financial innovation has been immanent in the workings of financial 
markets and has emphasized the importance of diversity of (national) institutional 
forms in the rich palette of historical analysis of financial markets.1 For instance, he 
has argued that, after the introduction of limited liability, Britain became an early 
pioneer in the divorce of shareholders from management, something that took decades 
in the US to fully develop.2 The early adoption of the corporate form generally 
boosted economic growth,3 and corporate finance differed significantly between 
developed economies before WWI.4
In the case of Britain, the early ‘managerial revolution’ and the existence of 
dispersed shareholdings beg the question of portfolio diversification at the individual 
level. In a financial market which was dominated by individual investors
 
5 and in 
which ownership was gradually detached from managerial control,6
 Portfolio diversification was a popular investment strategy recommendation 
made by UK financial advisers at least from the 1870s, in particular arguing for 
equally-weighted portfolios, or so-called naïve diversification. Over time, investors 
were gradually introduced to more sophisticated versions of naïve diversification and 
were shown how to use correlation to reduce overall portfolio risk by spreading their 
savings worldwide. By 1914 only the mathematical optimisation of Markowitz’ 
model was lacking in terms of portfolio practice. 
 how did investors 
manage financial risk and allocate their wealth among alternative risky financial 
assets? To what extent was financial innovation in corporate governance coupled or 
accompanied by a parallel financial innovation in portfolio selection strategies at the 
individual level? Was investment management before modern portfolio theory 
rudderless and unsophisticated or was it, also, able to benefit from innovation? Did 
individual investors follow experts’ recommendations and, if not, why not? 
                                                             
1 Hannah, “The divorce.” 
2 Hannah, “The divorce,” and Foreman-Peck and Hannah, “Managerial revolution.” 
3 Hannah, “Corporate census,” and Foreman-Peck and Hannah, “The diffusion.” 
4 Hannah, “Corporate finance.” 
5 Individual investors were by far the most important category of investor before WWI. See Rutterford 
and Hannah, “Institutional Investors”. 
6 Foreman-Peck and Hannah, “Managerial revolution.” 
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There is a growing consensus in recent business history research that 
diversification played an important role in the structure of financial markets before 
WWI. This insight adds a fresh analytical layer to the long-standing debates relating 
to the workings of capital markets in the past, with a particular focus on the UK. 
Despite the fact that empirical research on individual shareholdings has been 
hampered by data scarcity, two studies specifically investigate Victorian portfolios at 
the micro level.7 Other research attempts to explain some stylized facts in UK 
financial history on the basis of modern portfolio theory at the macro or stock market 
level.8
 
 This line of thought leads to a research hypothesis, already posited by C. K. 
Hobson on the eve of WWI. Describing wealthy investors, C. K. Hobson argued that 
cross-country capital flows were affected by wealth distribution, investment expertise, 
and risk preference: 
[...] These expert investors, who have a large capital at their disposal, are in an 
advantageous position for spreading their investments, geographically or otherwise, so 
as to obtain a high return, while running no greater risks on their aggregate holdings 
than the individual who obtains a lower return from a small investment in some gilt-
edged stock. Differences in the knowledge possessed by investors, in their wealth, and 
in their willingness to bear risks, may result in cross investment between countries.9
 
 
Hobson’s argument reflects a commonly held viewpoint within the discussions of his 
time. For instance, in 1916, Powell also acknowledged that diversification, in the form 
described by Henry Lowenfeld and others as the geographical distribution of risk, was 
well established before WWI among wealthy investors.10
 In this paper, we provide some evidence that the global naïve diversification 
strategy recommended by advisers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
compared well in performance terms relative to naïve diversification. We argue that, 
as a result, naïve diversification is a more useful benchmark with which to measure 
the efficiency of actual portfolio selection during this period than is Markowitz 
 Correlation between 
security prices and returns, in the light of financial advice at the time, may have 
played a role in the explanation of several financial developments before WWI. 
                                                             
7 See Rutterford and Sotiropoulos, “Portfolio diversification” and “Individual investors” for a 
comprehensive discussion of diversification in England and Wales from 1870 to WWI. 
8 See Goetzmann and Ukhov, “British investment,” Le Bris “Benefits from diversification,” Edlinger et 
al. “World portfolio,” Mitchell et al., “British railways,” Chabot Kurz, “Foreign bias.” 
9 Hobson, Export of Capital, 234. 
10 Powell, The Evolution, 464-478. 
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optimization.11
 Drawing upon a unique dataset of 507 individual probate portfolios, we also 
argue that investors’ portfolio choices at death differed from those recommended by 
experts due to the adoption of a ‘buy and hold’ strategy. Investors with enough wealth 
to be able to diversify gradually acquired securities from the available choices in the 
market without divesting existing holdings. This investment strategy was related to 
investors’ new social status as rentiers with no particular ownership interest in 
specific companies. The Victorian investor did not transform their wealth into 
influence over British industrial and commercial enterprises, as their US counterparts 
did over US companies, but rather chose to diversify over time, leading to apparently 
unbalanced portfolios. This rise of the diversified investor was tied to the 
cotemporaneous separation of corporate ownership from control. 
 This result shows that pre-WWI financial advice to adopt equal and 
global portfolio weighting was neither simplistic nor unsophisticated. Experts’ 
recommendations offered a well-organized, comprehensive, and rather handy 
practical paradigm of risk management during the era of the gold standard, in which 
exchange risk could effectively be ignored (when investing in overseas securities) and 
computation capacities did not allow optimisation according to the Markowitz model. 
 
 
2. The rationale for diversification 
 
According to the mainstream research in finance, the original portfolio diversification 
strategy is associated with the seminal intervention of Markowitz in the 1950s.12 The 
standard story is that not until Markowitz’ paper on diversification in 1952, and in 
practice not until the advent of fast computers in the 1970s, were these modern 
approaches to portfolio management fully implemented.13 Prior to this, investors are 
thought to have made inefficient, unsophisticated portfolio selections.14
 Markowitz derived an optimal rule for allocating wealth across risky assets in 
a static setting when investors are assumed to be risk averse, wanting to maximize 
their expected investment return (generally agreed to be the total of income and 
capital gain over a particular period) for a given level of risk (or, alternatively, to 
 
                                                             
11 This diffres from existing studies that use Markowitz optimization as sophistication benchmark: 
Goetzmann and Ukhov, “British investment,” Edlinger et al. “World portfolio,” Mitchell et al., “British 
railways.” 
12 Markowitz, “Portfolio theory,” 5. See also Markowitz, “Portfolio selection.” The main insights into 
mean-variance portfolio selection were anticipated in the 1940s by de Finetti (see Barone, “Bruno de 
Finetti”) and developed independently by Roy, “Safety first.” 
13 Read, The Rise. 
14 See, for example, Bernstein, Against the Gods. 
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minimize risk relative to the return they seek). The measure most commonly used to 
quantify risk is the variance of returns. This application of a mean-variance model to 
the portfolio selection problem laid the ground for modern portfolio theory (hereafter 
MPT), triggering, inspiring and influencing a vast amount of research in finance. The 
main insight is simple: if individual security risk is captured by the expected variance 
of returns, portfolio risk requires a set of variances and covariances in order to be 
fully described. In other words, when it comes to the analysis of portfolio risk, one 
needs to take into account not only the individual components’ risks but also their 
interactions. The optimization solution leads to a hyperbola depicting all the possible 
maximum returns for a given level of risk in the risk-expected return space. From all 
possible combinations in the hyperbola curve, the optimal portfolio is the one that 
maximizes the so-called Sharpe ratio, which is equal to the expected excess return of 
the portfolio relative to the risk-free asset, divided by the expected standard deviation 
of the portfolio.15
 There are two main problems with this train of thought. On the one hand, 
implementation of mean-variance optimal portfolio selection in practice is not that 
straightforward. For example, the optimal solution is very sensitive to initial 
assumptions with regard to investors’ expectations and future returns. This usually 
leads to significant estimation errors, due to which optimized portfolios are rarely 
optimal in practice.
 
16 We further discuss this point below. On the other hand, and 
more importantly, investors were not helpless nor did they lack investment advice on 
how to diversify their portfolios before the rise of MPT.17
                                                             
15 Markowitz’s mean-variance model was designed for a single period: an investor is assumed to 
estimate the mean and the variance of return for each asset being considered for the portfolio over the 
single period. Subsequent research has attempted to generalize the single period model to a multi-
period one under various assumptions about investor utility functions and dependency of returns 
between periods, see Elton and Gruber, “Portfolio theory.” 
 The investment approach of 
spreading risk across a number of different securities worldwide was widely and 
consistently promoted within the UK financial community at least from the 1870s. 
Financial advisers and analysts offered detailed recommendations on how best to 
combine a number of investments in a portfolio in order to enhance yield without 
increasing portfolio volatility. A series of investment books, magazines, pamphlets, 
and newspaper articles made investors aware of the benefits of spreading risks at 
home and abroad through naïve diversification, that is, through equally weighting 
their portfolios across risky assets. 
16 For a general discussion of the problems in the implementation of the mean-variance portfolio 
selection and its practical performance see: DeMiguel et al., “Optimal Versus Naive,” Michaud, 
“Markowitz optimization,” Litterman, Investment Management, and Black and Litterman, “Portfolio 
Optimization.” 
17 For an extensive analysis of this point see Rutterford and Sotiropoulos, “Financial diversification.” 
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 Financial advice on how to best structure investment portfolios in the UK 
increased in sophistication over time. By 1914 only the mathematical optimisation of 
Markowitz’ model was lacking in terms of portfolio best practice in the UK. More 
emphasis was gradually placed on the idea of correlation and on reducing portfolio 
risk by proper selection of poorly correlated but equally volatile securities. 
Sophisticated diversification strategies were actively promoted by a number of 
contributors to the Financial Review of Reviews, a monthly magazine aimed at retail 
investors first published in 1905, and in textbooks aimed at individual investors such 
as Investment an Exact Science, authored by Henry Lowenfeld, and were also 
promulgated by other authors.18
 This top-down approach argued for international diversification. Securities 
from the same (domestic) market were thought of as more likely to be positively 
correlated. Domestic diversification was not ruled out but the selection of domestic 
securities was argued to be more difficult and demanding for the ordinary investor 
than choosing, say, overseas government bonds, while the portfolio itself would be 
heavily reliant on domestic market movements.
 These studies did not identify an efficient set of 
portfolios according to mean-variance optimization, nonetheless they offered an 
insightful and practical framework for the main principles and building blocks of 
financial diversification. Historical analysis of returns, price volatility, and correlation 
were all taken into account in the portfolio selection. Investors were advised how to 
target a particular level of yield at the portfolio level and reduce capital risk through 
the choice of relatively uncorrelated securities. While portfolios were supposed to be 
equally-weighted, portfolio selection was not passive but driven by identification of 
low correlation between securities. 
19 Diversification was perceived as a 
“systematic method of averaging risks”20 or, alternatively as a method to neutralize 
and balance risks against each other,21 but in practice it became a method of 
“geographical distribution of capital.” International diversification was assumed to 
offer more beneficial covariances than domestic diversification as it allowed investors 
to “obtain as great a contrast as is possible in the trade influences which govern each 
one of his holdings”.22
 This approach of top-down international naïve diversification did not pass 
unnoticed, nor was it unchallenged. In a review of Lowenfeld’s book, Layton argued 
 
                                                             
18 For instance, see Crozier, First Principles, May, “Assurance funds,” and Withers, The Quicksands. 
Lowenfeld’s intervention became so popular that it also influenced French discussions, see Rutterford 
and Sotiropoulos “Financial diversification.” 
19 Lowenfeld, Investment, 106-7. 
20 Lowenfeld, Investment, 61; Hobson, Export of Capital, 234. 
21 Crozier, First Principles. 
22 Crozier, First Principles, 90. 
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that discovering internationally uncorrelated securities was by no means an easy 
exercise for investors with small portfolios, who should seek expert advice.23 Another 
review in The Times five years later by an anonymous correspondent made a similar 
point, concluding that “it is unfortunately evident that the ordinary private investor 
has not the means of investigating the merits of a security in a remote part of the 
world.”24 Despite these reservations, critics did not dispute the benefits of this 
approach to diversification to the individual investor, which became well established 
through textbooks, magazine and newspaper articles as well as through investment 
advice on individual portfolios.25
 
 
 
3 The case for naïve diversification over Markowitz optimization 
 
We have shown how financial advisers in the UK before WWI introduced the concept 
of correlation in the context of equally weighted and globally exposed portfolio 
selection. We should not dismiss such portfolio selection a priori as unsophisticated 
or suboptimal in relation to Markowitz optimization. Indeed, recent investment 
management experience and related research have shown that the strategy of equal-
weighting may significantly outperform mean-variance optimization. Unconstrained 
Markowitz optimization usually offers impracticable results and poor guidance to 
investors.26
 There are two reasons for this.
 
27 First, Markowitz optimization relies on 
expected returns, which are very difficult to estimate. In practice, historical averages 
provide very poor forecasts of future returns.28
                                                             
23 Layton, “About Investment.” 
 Second, optimization results for asset 
allocation are extremely sensitive to the return assumptions used. They often offer 
awkward portfolios with extreme positive and negative portfolio weights and, when 
constraints rule out short selling (an appropriate assumption for investor behaviour 
pre-World War I), constrained optimization often suggests ‘corner’ solutions with 
24 The Times, Friday 9 January 1914, p. 13.  
25 See Rutterford and Sotiropoulos, “Financial diversification.” 
26 DeMiguel et al., “Optimal Versus Naive,” Michaud, “Markowitz optimization.” 
27 Black and Litterman, “Portfolio Optimization,” 28. 
28 Black and Litterman, “Portfolio Optimization,” 30. One should also take into consideration the 
lesson from the recent financial meltdown that 'long tail' events are not as rare as one might expect (see 
Mandelbrot and Hudson, The Misbehaviour). Even if we assume, for simplicity, that all investors hold 
the expectation that past returns are the best estimate of future returns, and have full information as to 
these returns, a very long time series of data is required in order to have reliable estimates of future 
mean returns and variances of returns. DeMiguel et al., “Optimal Versus Naive,” 1919; Merton, 
“Estimating.” 
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many zero portfolio weights and unreasonably large weights in assets with small 
market capitalizations. When expected returns are fed into input-sensitive 
optimization models, prescribed portfolios are unreliable in terms of their anticipated 
performance and practical use due to the high estimation errors. For that reason, many 
authors have called mean-variance optimization “estimation-error maximization”29 
explaining why contemporary investment managers continue to resist its full 
adoption. Many studies provide plenty of evidence that gains from optimal 
diversification are more than offset by estimation errors and thus naïve diversification 
(equal-weighting) strategies may significantly outperform Markowitz optimization. 
As a result, recent research on portfolio allocation devotes considerable effort towards 
finding ways of handling estimation error and thereby improving the actual 
performance of the Markowitz model.30
 This is in addition to the fact that Markowitz optimised portfolios are often 
counter-intuitive, since the effects of correlation between assets is not always evident. 
In contrast, equal weighting is both easy to understand and easy to implement. Also, 
both models are single period models. Rebalancing portfolios using Markowitz 
optimisation is complex to do in practice, as the optimal portfolio in one period may 
be very different from the initial weightings and require radical restructuring. On the 
other hand, for naïve portfolios, both building portfolios up over time or rebalancing 
are, in principle, relatively straightforward. 
 
 Figure 1 offers some evidence for the superiority of naïve diversification over 
constrained (ruling out short sales) mean-variance portfolio optimisation in practice 
using historical financial returns of the period 1870-1913. It depicts cumulative real 
returns for five different portfolios, all derived from the 19 asset classes used by 
Goetzmann and Ukhov in their diversification analysis.31
                                                             
29 Michaud, “Markowitz optimization,” 31. 
 From Figure 1, we can see 
that naïve portfolio selection beats Markowitz optimization in four out of the five 
portfolios. Naïve diversification is particularly efficient when we move from domestic 
to more international portfolio exposure, a finding that justifies Lowenfeld and 
contemporary financial advice to hold a portfolio which was diversified 
internationally and not just nationally. 
30 For a summary of this literature see DeMiguel et al., “Optimal Versus Naive,” 1916. 
31 These five portfolios are denoted: Domestic, International 1; International 2; Aggregated by Sector; 
and Aggregated by Security. These five portfolios include 11, 11, 11, 7 and 5 asset classes respectively. 
Goetzmann and Ukhov, “British investment,” were the first to directly employ the concept of 
diversification in the study of Victorian financial markets. They used financial returns from Edelstein’s 
original research, Overseas Investment, regrouping them into 19 different asset classes. They calculated 
Markowitz optimized portfolio weights on the eve of WWI on the basis of the standard historical 
average approach, whereby expected excess returns (to feed the optimization exercise) are taken from 
their historical averages for the whole period between 1870 and 1913.  
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[FIGURE 1 AND TABLE 1 NEAR HERE] 
 
 Using broad asset categories instead of selection of individual securities means 
that we allocate financial wealth across portfolios of holdings rather than individual 
securities. Each asset category used in the calculations of Figure 1 is basically the 
unweighted average index of several individual securities in Edelstein’s initial 
database. In practice, however, people invested in individual securities. Markowitz 
optimization of individual securities is a difficult and demanding activity, and 
expensive in terms of resources. Naïve portfolio selection thus emerges as a more 
reliable and easy-to-follow strategy for the individual investor who faces severe 
resource constraints. The performance of naïve diversification is in general (when 
historic returns are used as estimates of expected returns) superior to the more 
complex Markowitz optimisation. Such a strategy pre-WWI was therefore by no 
means unsophisticated when applied in practice. In the following section, we look at 
the sample of 507 portfolios at death to explore the extent and type of diversification 
which individual investors adopted in practice. 
 
 
4. How diversified were investors in practice? 
 
Table 2 looks at the average number of holdings per portfolio and portfolio wealth as 
a percentage of gross wealth for our sample of 507 investor portfolios at death 
between 1870 and 1902. For all wealth quartiles, financial portfolio investments 
accounted for a significant proportion of gross wealth − between 44% and 58% of 
total gross wealth. However, individual investors in the top quartile of gross wealth 
for the sample, that is, investors who had “large capital in their disposal” according to 
Hobson, held on average 11 securities in their portfolios and their financial 
investment comprised 86% of the total financial investment. 
 
[TABLE 2 NEAR HERE] 
 
 In Table 2,we can also see that diversification is in general related to wealth: 
investors in the three lower quartiles of the wealth distribution diversified their 
portfolios much less than did those in the top quartile, with an average of 1.5, 2.3, and 
3.6 holdings from first to third quartile respectively. However, due to the extreme 
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wealth polarization in our sample, it was mostly the portfolio selection of the very 
rich that actually defined overall investment structure at the aggregate level.32 In other 
words, Hobson’s assumption seems quite valid: knowledge, risk preference, and 
wealth distribution heavily influenced portfolio selection and cross-border investment 
before WWI.33
 Significant portfolio diversification was thus an established practice − at least 
among relatively wealthy investors in the sample, who accounted for the bulk of our 
sample’s financial investments. Those at the top 10% of the wealth distribution held 
on average 14 different securities in their portfolios, and this decile accounted for 
almost two thirds of total portfolio wealth. These top 10% of investors in gross wealth 
terms held financial portfolios which ranged in value between £25,000 and 
£287,000.
 
34 Such individual wealth was enough to fully control a registered company. 
For example, according to Essex-Crosby’s estimates for 1894,35 about 70% of 
registered joint-stock companies had total paid-up capital, including fixed income 
loans, below £250,000 and 42% below £100,000.36
 Table 2 also explores how close the portfolios were to a benchmark naïve, 
equal weighting portfolio strategy. It presents information on the largest portfolio 
 Thus, individuals in our sample 
who were high in the wealth distribution had enough means to buy and control whole 
companies. And yet they consistently chose to spread their investments across 
different securities, sectors and countries. Seeking out poorly correlated securities to 
form part of a diversified portfolio thus played a role in Victorian investors’ choices 
and should be part of the explanation of overall financial trends at the time. 
                                                             
32 Institutional investor portfolios at the time represented a relatively small part of total stock exchange 
capitalization: Rutterford and Hannah, “Institutional investors.” 
33 The Table 2 sample data cover the years between 1870 and 1902. There is a tendency in our sample 
for diversification − as measured by number of holdings − to increase with wealth and time, so the 
same results are expected to hold until the outbreak of war in 1914. A more detailed analysis of 
Victorian investor diversification can be found in Sotiropoulos and Rutterford, “Individual investors.” 
In the beginning of the 1900s, investors were typically advised to spend as much as £100 per different 
security. On the basis of that recommendation, full diversification for less wealthy investors was not 
that straightforward. One should also take into consideration transaction costs, which would add an 
additional barrier for less wealthy investors (Michie, Stock Exchanges, 53). 
34 On the basis of the data offered by the World Wealth & Income Database, the average individual net 
private wealth for 1895 was £469 as opposed to £9,898 average net wealth for the individuals in our 
dataset for the period 1870-1902. The average net wealth for our dataset is comparable with the 
average net private wealth of the top 10% of the UK wealth distribution, which was £4,361 in 1895 (in 
current prices), and much lower than the average net wealth of the top 1% of the UK wealth 
distribution, which was £32,821 in the same year. As expected, this indicates that the portfolio holders 
in our sample, despite their diversity in terms of wealth − for instance, 16% of our investors are below 
the UK average figure for net wealth − are on average closer to the top 10% of wealthy people in the 
UK. 
35 The year chosen, 1894, is the closest year in the Essex-Crosby data to 1902, the final year in our 
sample period. 
36 Essex-Crosby, Joint Stock Companies, 221. 
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weights held by investors in different parts of the wealth distribution, with respect to 
the largest one or two holdings. The table shows that there is significant portfolio 
concentration. Portfolios are unbalanced even among wealthier and more diversified 
investors. Investors in the top wealth quartile, for example, invested 64.5% of their 
portfolio wealth in just one or two holdings. We now explore possible reasons for this 
deviation from a naïve diversification strategy. 
 
 
5. The role of personal characteristics in under-diversification 
 
In previous research using the same sample, we have found three socio-demographic 
factors which influenced portfolio selection: wealth, gender, and local preference.37
 Table 3 attempts to capture possible reasons for this divergence between a 
recommended investment strategy and its implementation in practice. The dependent 
variables are: (a) the difference between the number of holdings in the benchmark 
portfolio NB and the actual portfolio holdings N, and (b) the difference between the 
sum of squared portfolio weights SSPW and the sum of squared portfolio weights of 
the benchmark naïve portfolio SSPWB.
 
Wealth was related to more portfolio holdings and men held slightly more diversified 
portfolios than women. Less wealthy investors showed some preference for local 
listings (for which they might be better informed) as an alternative risk management 
strategy compared with more conventional spreading of risk across different 
securities. When it comes to how they diversified, the previous sections have argued 
that financial advisers at the time recommended a portfolio diversification strategy − 
top-down equally-weighted global portfolios − which was a sophisticated approach to 
risk reduction without sacrificing return. Nevertheless, even wealthy investors were 
reluctant to follow these recommendations. How can we explain this difference from 
the equally-weighted portfolio benchmark? Why did investors generally appear to 
ignore the experts’ advice to equally spread risk domestically or, better, worldwide? 
38
                                                             
37 See Sotiropoulos and Rutterford, “Portfolio diversification;” Rutterford et al., “Local bias.” 
 Both variables capture the extent of under-
diversification in relation to the equally weighted benchmark. As benchmark portfolio 
38 In line with similar research, the SSPW captures the diversification level of a portfolio by its 
deviation from the market portfolio. Since, the weight of each security in the overall market portfolio is 
very small, this diversification measure is in practice equal to the sum of the squared portfolio weights. 
SSPW identifies unbalanced portfolios, capturing the extent to which the value of a portfolio is 
concentrated in a few securities. For a given number of holdings, the more balanced the portfolio the 
lower the SSPW. Hence, the difference SSPW-SSPWB is a measure of divergence from the equally 
weighted benchmark portfolio (for instance, see Sotiropoulos and Rutterford, “Portfolio 
diversification;” Blume and Friend, “Asset structure”). 
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we have used the naïve portfolio structure suggested by Lowenfeld, as explained in 
the notes to Table 3, which assumes more securities in the naïve diversification 
portfolio, the greater the value of the portfolio.39 The higher the dependent variable of 
specification (1), the lower the number of holdings in relation to the benchmark 
portfolio. The higher the dependent variable of specification (2), the more unbalanced 
the portfolio in relation to the equally weighted benchmark. The explanatory variables 
include personal characteristics and some sophistication proxies in line with relevant 
research.40
 
 
[TABLE 3 NEAR HERE] 
 
From Table 3 there is some evidence in specification (1) that, of the personal 
characteristics included, age and gender were related to under-diversification in 
relation to the benchmark (statistically significant at the 10% level). More 
sophisticated investors, who chose to include non-domestic securities or investment 
trust securities in their portfolios,41
 Given the wealth background of the investors in our sample, in which the 
median financial portfolio is almost as high as £800, early large share denominations 
or transaction costs could possibly explain the under-diversification of some of the 
less wealthy investors, but cannot explain the divergence from the equally weighted 
portfolio benchmark for the full sample. The regressions in Table 3 include only 
portfolios higher in value than £500, to exclude possible barriers to diversification 
which might apply to smaller investors, such as high nominal values for securities or 
high transaction costs. However, these are unlikely to have been an issue for investors 
 selected on average more portfolio holdings than 
the benchmark portfolio. Wealth does not seem to play any role: wealthy investors 
diverged as much from the benchmark as did the less wealthy. However, the most 
striking finding, shown in specification (2), is that none of the independent variables 
in the regressions can describe the unbalanced nature of the individual portfolios. 
                                                             
39 This recommendation is the only existing explicit recommendation of how to set up a naive portfolio 
that we are aware of. It comes from Lowenfeld’s 1907 pamphlet, which is slightly later than our 
sample. However, it does offers a naive portfolio reference to compare the portfolio selection in our 
sample. 
40 See Sotiropoulos and Rutterford, “Portfolio diversification;” Goetzmann and Kumar, “Portfolio 
diversification.” 
41 In the regressions, we treat investment trusts as proxy for investment skills. It was mostly diversified 
investors in our who chose to add investment trust securities in their portfolios. The period of our 
dataset coincides with the rise of investment trust but their overall capitalization was negligible in 
relation to total market capitalization. Investment trusts offered indirect diversification but failed to 
attract less sophisticated investors. 
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at a time when nominal values were on a downward trend.42 Also, individual 
investors could buy any amount of stock, such as for Indian railway stock or Consols, 
and transaction costs were relatively low. Despite the fact that the London Stock 
Exchange Committee was reluctant to define a typical broker commission, the latter 
was generally not high enough to hinder transactions. The standard accepted rate for 
government stock was just 0.125% of the nominal value, whilst, for shares, 
commission ranged between 0.0625% and 0.5% of the nominal value.43 The bid-ask 
spread, the so-called jobber’s turn, was also very low under normal conditions: for 
instance, a typical spread for Consols was no higher than £0.125.44
 
 Other reasons, 
perhaps deeply rooted in the investment culture of the time, must explain investor 
divergence from equal portfolio weights. 
 
6. The role of stock selection strategies in under diversification 
 
We now look at whether investors adopted a particular investment strategy – different 
from naïve diversification − which can explain the unbalanced and variable nature of 
the portfolios in our sample. One possible investment strategy would have been to buy 
what the market offered. This can be called a passive or market approach to 
investment, linked to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which starts from 
Markowitz optimization and in addition assumes a common risk-free rate and 
homogeneous views on future risks and returns. It leads to the optimal portfolio, for 
all investors, being a share of the market portfolio – all securities in the market 
according to their market values – with more or less of the risk-free asset depending 
on risk preference.45
                                                             
42 See Jefferys, “The denomination,” 45-6, and Jefferys, Business organization, 454. For the 3,720 
companies that were formed between 1856 and 1865 and were still in existence in 1865: 16.06% had 
share denomination up to £5, 23.3% had share denomination of £5, 30.5% had share denomination 
between £5 and £10, 21.87% between £10 and £100, and 8.27% between £100 and £5,000. This means 
that about 70% of the existing shares had denomination lower than £10, which is by no means high for 
the investors in our sample. Acheson et al., “Denomination of shares,” also argue that the average share 
denomination drifted downwards the whole between 1825 and 1870. 
 One expectation from this ‘CAPM’ approach is that investors 
would have similar ‘market’ portfolios, with significant amounts of government 
bonds and railways which accounted for more than 70% of the value of the London 
Stock Exchange listed securities at the time. 
43 Morgan and Thomas, The Stock Exchange, 153. We need to include the stamp duty to broker 
commission, but it does not change the argument. most retail investors paid the official LSE rate 
44 Powell, The Mechanism, 45. 
45 Read, The Rise. 
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 Table 4, which compares the sample’s average portfolio weights with the 
market portfolio’s weights, shows that this is not the case. There is substantial 
variation in portfolio selection at the individual level, even for sectors in which 
average individual portfolio weights were comparable to corresponding overall 
market weights. For example, Table 4 shows that the median portfolio weight is zero 
for all asset categories and, in some cases (in non-UK government, non-UK railways, 
and in light and heavy industry), the third quartile portfolio weight is also zero or 
close to zero. The mean portfolio weight figures shown in the first column can thus be 
quite misleading when considering actual decision making at the individual level: 
70% of investors did not invest in UK government stocks; 90% of portfolios did not 
include a single foreign railway security; 64% of investors did not select any finance-
related security (broadly defined), and about 87% of investors did not invest in either 
foreign or empire government stock. At the same time, a non-negligible proportion of 
the sample portfolios included just one category of those reported in Table 4. For 
instance, almost one in five investors held only Consols, colonial or foreign 
government securities. Thus, there is no evidence that investors followed a passive, 
CAPM strategy which, instead of equal weights, sought to replicate the market value 
weights of the sectors of the London Stock Exchange. 
 
[TABLE 4 NEAR HERE] 
 
 Alternatively, could financial returns shed light on why individual portfolios 
in our sample diverged from the equally weighted benchmark? Were investors keen to 
abandon equal portfolio weighting, instead preferring to target sectors with high real 
returns? Could an active, marketing timing or ‘momentum’ strategy have been 
adopted by investors? Figure 2 offers some evidence against this assumption. It shows 
how individual portfolio weights in the sample are related to real market returns for 
15 broad asset categories.46
                                                             
46 In our calculations we have assumed the following 15 broad asset categories: (1) UK government; 
(2) UK municipalities; (3) Colonial government; (4) Foreign government; (5) non-UK municipalities; 
(6) UK railways; (7) Colonial railways; (8) Foreign railways; (9) Finance; (10) Financial, Land and 
Investment; (11) Light industry; (12) Heavy industry; (13) Extraction; (14) Infrastructure; and (15) 
Agriculture. Our dataset is incomplete with regard to the type of the security. These 15 broad asset 
categories are derived from the 19 asset categories of Goetzmann and Ukhov, “British investment,” 
when we aggregate by sector in order to eliminate any reference to security type. 
 From Figure 2, it is hard to identify any meaningful 
relationship when we relate portfolio weights to either financial returns at death or 
average financial returns of the last five years before death. The most intriguing 
finding from Figure 2 is that, for the more diversified portfolios, those with more than 
three holdings, weights are on average negatively related to real financial returns 
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(although the fit is very poor). One possible explanation for the effect captured by 
Figure 2 could be that investors adopted a diversification strategy on a buy and hold 
basis. Portfolios seem to have remnants from decisions made at different times in the 
past (that is, different stages of investors’ lives) and thus appear on average much less 
sensitive or even entirely indifferent to recent trends in financial profitability. As a 
matter of fact, some of these portfolios may well have been inherited and thus remote 
from the existing market conditions at death.47
 
 
[FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE] 
 
 
7. Buy as you go and hold strategies 
 
Although there is no evidence of market timing or market mirroring strategies from 
our sample, there is indeed some evidence supporting the assumption that Victorian 
investors followed a buy as you go and hold portfolio strategy. Table 5 looks at two 
diversified portfolios of wealthy investors in our dataset belonging to the top quartile 
of the gross wealth distribution. Portfolio (1), held by Mr George Heron, who died in 
1894 at the age of 89, includes 24 securities and is worth £57,198. The portfolio is 
unbalanced and shows a preference for mostly domestic securities. About 80% of 
portfolio value is invested in railways and 13% in Consols. Portfolio (2) belongs to a 
female investor, Ms Elizabeth Snaith, a spinster who died in 1890 at the age of 85. 
She invested £36,755 in a portfolio of 14 securities. The structure of the portfolio is 
different from that of Mr Heron but equally unbalanced with regard to railways and 
government stocks. This time about 62% of the portfolio value is invested in 
government stocks and only 29% in railways. Portfolio (2) is less domestically 
focused, with 40% of the portfolio’s value in non-UK securities and two small 
investments in philanthropic model dwelling companies. These two portfolios are 
snapshots in time and do not reveal traces of their past investment decisions. 
However, they are not dissimilar to different snapshots in time of Portfolio (3), shown 
in Figure 3, that follows the portfolio selection of Mr James Mott over a 47-year 
period between 1880 and 1927. Portfolio (3) is the result of a buy as you go and hold 
diversification strategy with acquisitions spread over the 1880s and early 1890s. 
There is a marked preference for steel companies and railways, with only two 
                                                             
47 A careful look at some company share registers justifies this argument. For instance, the majority of 
shareholders of the Cunard Steamship Company between 1880 and 1913 did not dispose of their 
shares. About 10% of the shares in the ledger appeared as held by Executors and hence were part of 
probate portfolios (this point comes for the dataset of Rutterford et al., “Local bias”). 
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corporation stocks which are not in these two sectors. There is a limited amount of 
rebalancing. Holdings in William Jessop and Sons, and Perry and Company, were 
sold while still going concerns, and replaced by holdings in the Patent Nut and Bolt 
Company (in 1885, at the time of a capital reduction) and in Cambrian Railway 
Company. Other apparent changes were triggered by a merger between Nettlefolds, 
and Guest and Keen, to form Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds, the forerunner of today’s 
GKN. Mr Mott’s portfolio trajectory, shown in Figure 3, may well be typical of many 
of the probate portfolios in our sample. What we actually see in the probate records 
could be the end result of securities acquired at different periods of one’s life span and 
rarely sold unless affected by corporate actions. Similarly, the unbalanced portfolios 
shown in Table 5 reflect different performance of different securities over different 
periods. Even what might (but not necessarily) have started out as equally weighted 
portfolios, with equal amounts invested in each security, would gradually become 
unbalanced over time as different countries, sectors, and securities experienced 
different returns, expectations or waves of popularity. 
 
[TABLE 5 NEAR HERE] 
[FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE] 
 
 We have seen above that neither personal characteristics, nor wealth, nor 
financial sophistication can explain why Victorian investors held portfolios which 
were unbalanced with respect to an equally-weighted, naïve diversification, strategy. 
Nor do transaction costs offer a convincing alternative reason to avoid portfolio 
rebalancing, at least for securities listed on the official LSE list. Liquidity may have 
been a factor – securities were easy to buy on issue, from a prospectus, but possibly 
hard to sell thereafter. However, this argument has limited traction as it is clear from 
the portfolios in Table 5 and Figure 3 that many of the investments held were 
government bonds or major railway companies. Securities in steel companies, for 
example, held by Mr Mott, where actively traded in Sheffield as well as in London 
and Figure 3 shows that he was able to sell his holdings in some steel companies, 
generating funds with which to invest in other securities. 
 There is another possible argument for some shares being illiquid: those which 
had an element of uncalled capital. In principle, uncalled capital is a liability to the 
individual investors resembling the corporate structure of the unlimited liability 
company, albeit with a cap. If uncalled capital did indeed drive investors away from 
sectors with high uncalled liabilities, this could potentially offer an explanation for the 
unbalanced structure of the sample portfolios. Figure 4 challenges this interpretation. 
It shows average portfolio weights and paid-up capital as a percentage of total called 
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and uncalled capital for two periods: 1870-1889 (period 1) and 1890-1902 (period 2) 
for a number of selected sectors. There is clearly a difference in the extent of uncalled 
capital over time, with several sectors, including banks and insurance firms relying 
more heavily on uncalled capital. However, it is hard to observe any specific 
relationship between average sector portfolio weights and the proportion of called 
capital as a percentage of total capital. Figure 4 highlights examples, (e.g. banks and 
financial firms) in which high average portfolio weights were associated with sectors 
with high uncalled capital and the vice versa. The democratization of financial 
markets with the entrance of a larger number of less wealthy investors towards the 
turn of the century was accompanied by a gradual reduction in the average amount of 
uncalled capital but this does not seem to have affected investors’ sector or security 
choices.48
 
 
[FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE] 
 
 
8. Summing up: the profile of the Victorian investor 
 
This paper has highlighted the role of portfolio diversification before WWI, a period 
in which investors had access to a wide variety of international and domestic 
securities. Data scarcity has generally discouraged the investigation of portfolio 
diversification at the micro level. This study draws upon a unique sample of 
individual portfolio holdings in England and Wales compiled from probate data at 
death between 1870 and 1902 and from existing relevant studies, attempting to draw a 
comprehensive profile of Victorian investment behaviour. 
 We first note that contemporary financial advice was not an unsophisticated 
portfolio risk management strategy. Financial experts widely promoted a naïve top-
down portfolio selection approach which was easy to implement by the individual 
investor and by no means suboptimal when compared with Markowitz mean-variance 
optimization. Indeed, given the institutional setting of financial markets in the late 
nineteenth century and the computational limitations, the recommended top-down 
naïve diversification was a powerful and practical investment strategy that sets a 
contemporary benchmark of portfolio efficiency for the investors in our sample. 
 We show that, although Victorian investors did not adopt the equal portfolio 
weights which are a prerequisite for naïve diversification, they did diversify their 
                                                             
48 Jefferys “The denomination.” 
19 
 
portfolios to a significant extent, particularly at the top end of the wealth distribution 
scale. According to our sample, investors in the top quartile of the gross wealth 
distribution, who were responsible for about 87% of overall portfolio investment, held 
on average 11 securities in their portfolios. There is thus support for Hobson’s 
assumption at the beginning of the twentieth century that the diversification strategies 
and risk preferences of wealthy investors did affect the structure of the financial 
markets before WWI. However, we find that sample portfolios were unbalanced, 
relative to a naïve, equally weighted portfolio strategy, for example, with investors in 
the top wealth quartile holding almost two thirds of their portfolios in just one or two 
holdings. 
 In previous studies, we have argued that wealth, gender, and local preference 
were the main factors in individual investor portfolio selection. These factors show, 
for instance, that wealthy investors spread risk across more securities, that men were 
slightly more diversified than women, and that less wealthy investors were more 
comfortable with local firms, perhaps as an alternative form of risk management. 
However, these studies do not explain why investors appeared reluctant to equally 
weight their portfolios, preferring unbalanced portfolios, contrary to the 
recommendations of financial experts at the time. None of the above factors at the 
individual level seems to affect the divergence which we observe in our sample 
portfolios from a naïve portfolio benchmark. In addition, unbalanced portfolios cannot 
be explained by high nominal share values, by transaction costs, which were relatively 
low, nor by the prevalence of uncalled liabilities in certain sectors. Unbalanced 
portfolios could alternatively be explained by the fact that investors followed either a 
CAPM portfolio strategy mirroring the market or a market-timing and momentum 
strategy buying securities in sectors which had performed well in the past. However, 
our evidence dismisses both cases. 
We therefore argue that the most plausible reason for the diversified but 
unbalanced portfolios – relative to a naïve diversification strategy – that we observe in 
the sample is that investors did buy and hold, and possibly in equal amounts, but over 
time (we must remember these are portfolios at death). Portfolio weights gradually 
altered as some securities did well and others did not. We look at the lifetime portfolio 
of a particular investor, James Nott, and note how he sold only two securities during 
his lifetime, other changes being triggered by corporate actions with limited 
adjustment or portfolio rebalancing over time. 
This type of behaviour is in fact captured by Lowenfeld’s recommendations. 
According to Lowenfeld, the investor should add to their portfolio over time, leading 
to more holdings as wealth increased. As the note to Table 3 elucidates, Lowenfeld 
recommended different numbers of equal holdings according to financial wealth: 5-6 
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for portfolios of £500 to £1,000; 5-7 for £1,000 to £2,000; 6-8 for £2,000 to £5,000, 8-
10 for £5,000 to £20,000, and 10 to 30 for portfolios of over £20,000. He also 
recommended investing by amounts of £100 per security, adding a different 
geographical class each time the individual has another £100 saved.49 Lowenfeld 
devotes a chapter of his book, Chapter VI, “The Treatment of Investment Lists,” in 
Investment an Exact Science, to how to rebalance portfolios, which, he argued, should 
be to first tabulate existing holdings against a geographically-diversified, equally 
weighted portfolio with the desired amount of risk and then to rebalance in order to 
return to the original equal weightings.50 He argued, as do we, that transaction costs 
were not an issue with respect to rebalancing, with the benefits of so doing more than 
outweighing the costs. He additionally offered a solution to investors who were 
unwilling to sell loss-making investments, today called the ‘disposition effect’.51 He 
suggested selling the loss-making investment and replacing it with a security that 
appeared relatively undervalued compared to previous highs and lows and which thus 
offered some potential profit with which to offset the crystallised loss.52 Lowenfeld 
also commented on the fact that some investors were reluctant to invest overseas, 
even though this would cost them financially in terms of opportunity cost. George 
Heron’s portfolio, shown in Table 6, is perhaps such an example, with only two 
overseas holdings out of a total of 24. We found, for our sample, that those who did 
invest overseas, directly or via investment trusts, had portfolios which were less 
unbalanced and closer to the benchmark than those who did not invest overseas. 
Lowenfeld also acknowledged that there is a natural reluctance to rebalance portfolios 
with the wealthy “especially dilatory.”53
Thus the most plausible factor for the unbalanced structure of individual 
portfolios in our sample is the buy as you go and hold approach of the individual 
investors. To the extent that our sample is representative of the UK investor 
population as a whole, the investors were on average closer to the top 10% of the 
wealth distribution. Instead of controlling single firms, they spread their financial 
wealth unevenly across a number of securities and sectors. This finding is consistent 
with Rubinstein’s analysis of the Victorian super rich: they did not transform their 
wealth into influence over important British industrial and commercial enterprises, as 
 It was easier for those who accumulated 
wealth over their lifetimes and hence invested over periods of time, to rebalance, 
although our lack of panel data does not allow us to test this for our sample. 
                                                             
49 Lowenfeld, Investment, 85, 90. 
50 Lowenfeld, Investment, 99-109. 
51 See, for example, Richards et al., “Disposition effect.” 
52 Lowenfeld, Investment, 104-5 
53 Lowenfeld, Investments, 107. 
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did their US counterparts.54
 
 Portfolio diversification is thus the other side of the 
gradual divorce between ownership and control in listed companies. 
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Table 1 
The portfolios used in the calculations of Figure 1. 
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Table 2 
Number of holdings per portfolio and percentage of portfolio wealth by gross wealth 
distribution. 
 
 
Notes: Our sample of 507 portfolios covers the period 1870-1902 (for more information 
about the sample see Sotiropoulos and Rutterford, “Individual investors”). Gross wealth is the 
gross estate including all liquid and illiquid assets: corporate securities (ordinary shares, 
preferred shares and debentures), real estate, cash, life assurance, and monies and interest due 
to deceased. Financial wealth is the liquid part of gross wealth other than cash. The average 
profile of our investors is closer to the top 10% of the UK population in terms of wealth. 
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Table 3 
Investor level cross sectional OLS regressions for the extent of under-diversification. 
 
* = significant at the 10% level. 
** = significant at the 5% level. 
*** = significant at the 1% level. 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The benchmark portfolio is defined according 
to the analysis of Lowenfeld (Investment, 85) and its holdings increase gradually but not 
proportionately with the portfolio value. From £500 up to £1,000 portfolio value, 5-6 holdings 
of equal value are advised; from £1,000 up to 2,000, 5-7 holdings of equal value; from £2,000 
up to £5,000, 6-8 holdings of equal value; from £5,000 up to £20,000, 8-10 holdings of equal 
value; and for portfolios larger than £20,000 10-30 holdings of equal value are advised. In the 
regressions, we have excluded portfolios with value lower than £500. 
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Table 4 
Portfolio weights by broad asset categories. 
 
 
Notes: The London Stock Exchange weights are based on the Stock Exchange Official 
Intelligence nominal values, which are translated to market values using the Bankers' 
Magazine index (see Sotiropoulos and Rutterford, “Individual investors”). The LSE weights 
are averages for the period 1884-1902. Foreign government stocks are non-UK non-colonial 
stocks. 0% = percentage of portfolios with zero investment in the corresponding category. 
100% = percentage of portfolios with 100% investment in the corresponding category. 
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Table 5 
Two examples of Victorian portfolios from the sample. 
 
Portfolio (1) 
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Portfolio (2) 
 
* The type of the security is not always known.  
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Figure 1 
Naïve versus Markowitz portfolio selection. 
 
 
Notes: In our calculations we use Edelstein’s annual return data as grouped into broad asset 
categories by Goetzmann and Ukhov (“British investment”) and converted into real returns 
using the inflation rates provided by Mitchell et al. (“British railways”). For definitions of 
different portfolios see Table 1. We calculate the actual (as opposed to expected) excess 
portfolio return that would have accrued to the mean-variance portfolio holder, based on the 
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estimated portfolio weights from Markowitz’s model and actual market asset returns. In each 
year, we update the data and repeat the calculations following a 25-year rolling window 
approach. In line with similar research in business history, we employ a bootstrapping 
procedure. The returns reported are based on the mean values of optimized portfolio weights 
after bootstrapping 1,000 times. We have assumed the prime bank bill rate as the risk-free rate 
(see Capie and Webber, A Monetary History). 
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Figure 2 
The relation between individual portfolio weights and realized real returns for fifteen 
main asset categories of the London Stock Exchange. 
 
 
Notes: The scatter charts depict the relation between the portfolio weight wi,j of the asset 
category j held in the portfolio of individual i and the real market return Rj of asset category j. 
Markets returns at the time of death are used in the top two charts, while the average returns 
of the last five years before death are used in the lower 2 charts. The fitted lines capture the 
average correlation between portfolio weights and the selected asset returns. The return data 
are the same as in Figure 1.  
34 
 
Figure 3 
Shares and stocks held by James Mott 1880 to 1927. 
 
 
Source: Green et al., “Lives in the balance,” 314.  
35 
 
Figure 4 
Average portfolio weights and paid-up capital as % of total issued capital for selected 
sectors in two periods: 1870-1889 (period 1) and 1890-1902 (period 2). 
 
 
Notes: The data for the paid-up capital are taken from the study of Essex-Crosby, Joint Stock 
Companies. For period 1, we average individual portfolio weights of the main economic 
sectors between 1870 and 1889 and we use Essex-Crosby’s paid-up calculations for 1885. In 
period 2, we average portfolio weights for 1890 and 1902 and we use Essex-Crosby’s 
calculations for 1895. FLI means Finance, Land, and Investment companies. The scatter chart 
selectively reports sectors and periods. 
 
 
 
